Threat bargaining problems with incomplete information

dc.contributor.author	Lahiri, Somdeb
dc.date.accessioned	2010-03-24T09:46:14Z
dc.date.available	2010-03-24T09:46:14Z
dc.date.copyright	1990-12
dc.date.issued	2010-03-24T09:46:14Z
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1598
dc.description.abstract	This paper is a revised version based on two of my earlier papers Lahiri (1989c) and Lahiri (1990). For useful suggestions and discussions I am grateful to Jim Jordan, T.Parthasarathy, Prakash Chander, Arunava Sen and the participants of the 1990 International Conference of Game Theory and Its Applications to Economic held at Indian Statistical Institute (New Delhi). In particular this paper has benefited from the comments of Hans Peters and Mamoru Kaneko.	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;1990/913
dc.subject	Bargaining	en
dc.subject	Incomplete information	en
dc.title	Threat bargaining problems with incomplete information	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en