Max-min solution for variable threat games

dc.contributor.author	Lahiri, Somdeb
dc.date.accessioned	2010-03-25T04:43:25Z
dc.date.available	2010-03-25T04:43:25Z
dc.date.copyright	1988-07
dc.date.issued	2010-03-25T04:43:25Z
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1619
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we obtain general inequality properties that max-min strategic solutions to Variable Threat Games satisfy under a set of very plausible assumptions.	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;1988/756
dc.subject	Inequality	en
dc.subject	Threat games	en
dc.title	Max-min solution for variable threat games	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en