The non manipulability of the utilitarian solution

dc.contributor.author	Lahiri, Somdeb
dc.date.accessioned	2010-03-25T08:47:26Z
dc.date.available	2010-03-25T08:47:26Z
dc.date.copyright	1992-10
dc.date.issued	2010-03-25T08:47:26Z
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1625
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we model threat bargaining problems as fixed threat bargaining games (with the threat point at the origin) and show that the utilitarian solution to threat bargaining problems is not manipulable.	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;1992/1062
dc.subject	Bargaining	en
dc.subject	Utilitarian solution	en
dc.title	The non manipulability of the utilitarian solution	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en