Restricted Expansion Independence for Choice Problems

dc.contributor.author	Lahiri, Somdeb
dc.date.accessioned	2010-03-27T06:08:27Z
dc.date.available	2010-03-27T06:08:27Z
dc.date.copyright	1995-02
dc.date.issued	2010-03-27T06:08:27Z
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1676
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we propose restricted expansion independence as a criterion which may be satisfied by desirable choice functions and axiomatically characterize the proportional solution by using this criterion. We also show that the proportional solution satisfies an improvement sensitivity property on a reasonable domain. The theory of solutions to choice problems is used in the paper to define solutions for coalitional bargaining problems.	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;1995/1233
dc.subject	Choice Problems	en
dc.subject	Choice function	en
dc.title	Restricted Expansion Independence for Choice Problems	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en