On a theorem due to sobel

dc.contributor.author	Lahiri, Somdeb
dc.date.accessioned	2010-03-27T06:33:43Z
dc.date.available	2010-03-27T06:33:43Z
dc.date.copyright	1993-08
dc.date.issued	2010-03-27T06:33:43Z
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1694
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we prove that any bargaining solution to group decision problems which satisfies individual rationality, strong symmetry, efficiency and strong improvement sensitivity also satisfies mid-point domination.	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;1131
dc.subject	Bargaining solution	en
dc.subject	Theorem	en
dc.title	On a theorem due to sobel	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en