On the existence and efficiency of a voting equilibrium for a public good economy

dc.contributor.author	Lahiri, Somdeb
dc.date.accessioned	2010-03-27T06:34:33Z
dc.date.available	2010-03-27T06:34:33Z
dc.date.copyright	1993-09
dc.date.issued	2010-03-27T06:34:33Z
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1695
dc.description.abstract	The main purpose of this paper is to formalise the concept of a compromise function. Subsequently, given a compromise function, we define a voting equilibrium and prove the existence of such an equilibrium. Finally, we close our analysis by showing that under some assumptions a voting equilibrium is Pareto optimal.	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;1993/1140
dc.subject	Voting equilibrium	en
dc.title	On the existence and efficiency of a voting equilibrium for a public good economy	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en