Threat bargaining games with a variable population
dc.contributor.author | Lahiri, Somdeb | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-03-27T06:41:58Z | |
dc.date.available | 2010-03-27T06:41:58Z | |
dc.date.copyright | 1989-01 | |
dc.date.issued | 2010-03-27T06:41:58Z | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1698 | |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper we establish links between desirable properties satisfied by familiar solutions to bargaining games with a variable population and the Nash equilibrium concept for threat bargaining games. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | WP;1989/776 | |
dc.subject | Bargaining | en |
dc.subject | Population | en |
dc.subject | Capital structure | en |
dc.subject | Finance institutions | en |
dc.subject | Industrial Credit & Investment Corporation of India | en |
dc.title | Threat bargaining games with a variable population | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
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