Threat bargaining games with a variable population

dc.contributor.author	Lahiri, Somdeb
dc.date.accessioned	2010-03-27T06:41:58Z
dc.date.available	2010-03-27T06:41:58Z
dc.date.copyright	1989-01
dc.date.issued	2010-03-27T06:41:58Z
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1698
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we establish links between desirable properties satisfied by familiar solutions to bargaining games with a variable population and the Nash equilibrium concept for threat bargaining games.	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;1989/776
dc.subject	Bargaining	en
dc.subject	Population	en
dc.subject	Capital structure	en
dc.subject	Finance institutions	en
dc.subject	Industrial Credit & Investment Corporation of India	en
dc.title	Threat bargaining games with a variable population	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en