Redundancy of additional alternatives and solutions to bargaining problems

dc.contributor.author	Lahiri, Somdeb
dc.date.accessioned	2010-03-28T11:11:29Z
dc.date.available	2010-03-28T11:11:29Z
dc.date.copyright	1989-03
dc.date.issued	2010-03-28T11:11:29Z
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1714
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we propose a new axiom called the redundancy of additional alternatives axiom, which is satisfied by the proportional solution. A weaker version of the same axiom is satisfied by the Kalai-Smorodinsky (3) solution. The Nash solution satisfies neither. This new axiom seems to be a reasonable compromise between accepting the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom and rejecting it outright, from the realm of axiomatic models of bargaining.	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;1989/791
dc.subject	Bargaining	en
dc.subject	Problems solving	en
dc.title	Redundancy of additional alternatives and solutions to bargaining problems	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en