Metric rationalization of bargaining solutions

dc.contributor.author	Lahiri, Somdeb
dc.date.accessioned	2010-03-28T11:35:11Z
dc.date.available	2010-03-28T11:35:11Z
dc.date.copyright	1989-03
dc.date.issued	2010-03-28T11:35:11Z
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1728
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we represent bargaining solutions by means of a metric which is defined on games, whereby the solutions are precisely those payoffs which are closest to being unanimously highest.	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;1989/795
dc.subject	Bargaining solutions	en
dc.title	Metric rationalization of bargaining solutions	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en