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dc.contributor.authorPowers, Brian
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-15T08:38:51Z
dc.date.available2016-02-15T08:38:51Z
dc.date.copyright2016-01-29
dc.date.issued2016-01-29
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11718/17471
dc.descriptionThe R & P seminar held at Wing 11 Committee Room, IIM Ahmedabad on January 29, 2016 by Mr. Brian Powers, University of Illinois at Chicago on "An Analysis of Multivariate final-offer arbitration".en_US
dc.description.abstractFirst proposed in 1966, in the United States Final-Offer Arbitration has been adopted by Major League Baseball as well as in the public sector in many states as a means or resolving negotiation impasses. We will discuss the mechanics of this arbitration method and the game theoretic model under which it has been studied. Some of the important results concerning zero-sum games and probability will be addressed. Finally we will look at the problem of extending the basic model to one where multiple issues are in dispute, and some of the surprising results of the extended model.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherIndian Institute of Management, Ahmedabaden_US
dc.subjectArbitrationen_US
dc.subjectMultivariateen_US
dc.titleAn Analysis of Multivariate final-offer arbitrationen_US
dc.typeVideoen_US


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