Metric rationalization of bargaining solutions and respect for unanimity

dc.contributor.author	Lahiri, Somdeb
dc.date.accessioned	2010-03-28T13:44:15Z
dc.date.available	2010-03-28T13:44:15Z
dc.date.copyright	1991-10
dc.date.issued	2010-03-28T13:44:15Z
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/1764
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we represent bargaining solutions by means of a metric which is defined on games, whereby the solutions are precisely those payoffs which are closest to being unanimously highest. Subsequently we study the properties of "welfare optimal rules" and rationalizability of bargaining solutions by symmetric metrics. This latter condition leads to anonymous bargaining solutions which satisfy "metric respect for unanimity."	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;1991/975
dc.subject	Bargaining	en
dc.title	Metric rationalization of bargaining solutions and respect for unanimity	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en