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dc.contributor.authorKishore, Kaushal
dc.date.accessioned2017-12-27T08:14:22Z
dc.date.available2017-12-27T08:14:22Z
dc.date.issued2017-10-27
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11718/20115
dc.descriptionThe R & P seminar held Wing 11 Committee Room, IIM Ahmedabad on October 27, 2017 by Prof. Kaushal Kishore, IIM Rohtak on Dynamic Tax Competition, Home Bias and the gain from Non-preferential Taxation Regimes: A case for unilateral commitment.en_US
dc.description.abstractIn a dynamic two-period model of tax competition between two symmetric countries, where an investor has home bias for the country where he/she invests in the initial period, we show that a country has an incentive to unilaterally commit to a non-preferential taxation regime even when the competitor follows a preferential taxation strategy. When one country commits to a non-preferential taxation regime and the other adopts a preferential taxation strategy, the tax revenue of the country which commits to a non-preferential taxation is higher than what it can obtain when both countries jointly adopt non-preferential taxation regimes. The tax revenue of the country which adopts a preferential taxation strategy is equal to what it obtains when both countries jointly adopt non-preferential taxation regimes.en_US
dc.publisherIndian Institute of Management Ahmedabaden_US
dc.subjectDynamic Taxen_US
dc.subjectHome biasen_US
dc.subjectTaxation strategyen_US
dc.subjectTax revenueen_US
dc.titleDynamic Tax Competition, Home Bias and the gain from Non-preferential Taxation Regimes: A case for unilateral commitmenten_US
dc.typeVideoen_US


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