dc.contributor.author | Kishore, Kaushal | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-12-27T08:14:22Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-12-27T08:14:22Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017-10-27 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/20115 | |
dc.description | The R & P seminar held Wing 11 Committee Room, IIM Ahmedabad on October 27, 2017 by Prof. Kaushal Kishore, IIM Rohtak on Dynamic Tax Competition, Home Bias and the gain from Non-preferential Taxation Regimes: A case for unilateral commitment. | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | In a dynamic two-period model of tax competition between two symmetric countries, where an investor has home bias for the country where he/she invests in the initial period, we show that a country has an incentive to unilaterally commit to a non-preferential taxation regime even when the competitor follows a preferential taxation strategy. When one country commits to a non-preferential taxation regime and the other adopts a preferential taxation strategy, the tax revenue of the country which commits to a non-preferential taxation is higher than what it can obtain when both countries jointly adopt non-preferential taxation regimes. The tax revenue of the country which adopts a preferential taxation strategy is equal to what it obtains when both countries jointly adopt non-preferential taxation regimes. | en_US |
dc.publisher | Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad | en_US |
dc.subject | Dynamic Tax | en_US |
dc.subject | Home bias | en_US |
dc.subject | Taxation strategy | en_US |
dc.subject | Tax revenue | en_US |
dc.title | Dynamic Tax Competition, Home Bias and the gain from Non-preferential Taxation Regimes: A case for unilateral commitment | en_US |
dc.type | Video | en_US |