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dc.contributor.authorLahiri, Somdeb
dc.date.accessioned2018-02-27T11:10:29Z
dc.date.available2018-02-27T11:10:29Z
dc.date.issued1989-09-01
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11718/20405
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we show that rationalizability of bargaining solution by a symmetric metric implies that the bargaining solution is anonymous. We further show that rations ability of a bargaining solution by a metric implies that a solution satisfies metrics respect for unanimity.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherIndian Institute of Management Ahmedabaden_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesW. P.;No. 823
dc.subjectSymmetric Metricen_US
dc.subjectRationalization of Bargainingen_US
dc.subjectRations Abilityen_US
dc.titleRationalization of bargaining solutions by symmetric metrics and respect for unanimityen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US


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