dc.contributor.author | Lahiri, Somdeb | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-03-01T08:32:50Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-03-01T08:32:50Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1989-12-01 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/20426 | |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper we extend the framework of threat bargaining games to include those with incomplete information. In this set up we address ourselves to two significant problems: (1) Under what conditions would 'truthful' revelation of the disagreement payoffs be a Nash equilibrium of the threat bargaining game? (2) Obtaining a characterization of the Nash bargaining solution without the Independence of Irrelevant alternation assumption. Our framework of analysis is general enough to include within its purview the study of non-cooperative bargaining problems, played by Bayesian players, although the specific problems addressed to in this paper does not fall in that category. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.publisher | Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | WP;836 | |
dc.title | Threat bargaining problems with incomplete information and Nash's solution | en_US |
dc.type | Working Paper | en_US |