Threat bargaining problems with incomplete information and correlated beliefs

dc.contributor.author	Lahiri, Somdeb
dc.date.accessioned	2018-03-05T03:48:32Z
dc.date.available	2018-03-05T03:48:32Z
dc.date.issued	1990-01-01
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/20434
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we provide a general framework for studying threat bargaining games with incomplete information and correlated beliefs. In this framework we obtain a characterization of the Kalai- Smorodinsky solution without any monotonicity assumption. The approach adds a dose of realism to the already existing literature on threat bargaining games.	en_US
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.publisher	Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;840
dc.subject	Threat bargaining games	en_US
dc.title	Threat bargaining problems with incomplete information and correlated beliefs	en_US
dc.type	Working Paper	en_US