dc.contributor.author | Lahiri, Somdeb | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-03-05T08:43:24Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-03-05T08:43:24Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1990-01-01 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/20443 | |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper we formalize the framework of an arbitration game, to accommodate a large class of situations where public decisions are implemented in a non-cooperative setting. We then present a method of computing the equilibrium strategies of the players under assumptions of bounded rationality, so that the solutions correspond to what is observed in any realization of an arbitration game. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.publisher | Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | WP;849 | |
dc.subject | Arbitration game | en_US |
dc.title | Arbitration by a Bayesian statistician and bounded rationality | en_US |
dc.type | Working Paper | en_US |