The revelation principle for arbitration games

dc.contributor.author	Lahiri, Somdeb
dc.date.accessioned	2018-03-05T10:32:09Z
dc.date.available	2018-03-05T10:32:09Z
dc.date.issued	1990-03-01
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/20449
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we prove the validity of the revelation principle for arbitration games and also establish that a large class of game forms can be represented as a Bayesian statistician. This adds force and appeal to the concept of an arbitration game.	en_US
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.publisher	Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;855
dc.subject	Bayesian statistics	en_US
dc.subject	Arbitration games	en_US
dc.title	The revelation principle for arbitration games	en_US
dc.type	Working Paper	en_US