dc.contributor.author | Agarwal, Shubham | |
dc.contributor.author | Ghosh, Diptesh | |
dc.contributor.author | Chakrabarti, Anindya | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-05-19T02:59:45Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-05-19T02:59:45Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2016 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Agarwal, S., Ghosh, D.,Cha krabarti, A Self -organization in a distributed coordination game through heuristic rules. The European Physical Journal B, 89(266). Retrieved from DOI: 10.1140/epjb/e2016-70464-0 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/21884 | |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper, we consider a distributed coordination game played by a large number of agents
with finite information sets, which characterizes emergence of a single dominant attribute out of a large
number of competitors. Formally, N agents play a coordination game repeatedly, which has exactly N
pure strategy Nash equilibria, and all of the equilibria are equally preferred by the agents. The problem
is to select one equilibrium out of N possible equilibria in the least number of attempts. We propose
a number of heuristic rules based on reinforcement learning to solve the coordination problem. We see
that the agents self-organize into clusters with varying intensities depending on the heuristic rule applied,
although all clusters but one are transitory in most cases. Finally, we characterize a trade-off in terms of
the time requirement to achieve a degree of stability in strategies versus the efficiency of such a solution. | en_US |
dc.publisher | Springer | en_US |
dc.subject | sociophysics literature | en_US |
dc.subject | Nash equilibria | en_US |
dc.title | Self-organization in a distributed coordination game through heuristic rules | en_US |
dc.title.alternative | THE EUROPEAN PHYSICAL JOURNAL | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |