Monitoring cost transaction interlinkage and the selection of optimal loan contracts: evidence from rural India

dc.contributor.author	Erickson, Christopher A.
dc.contributor.author	Ghosh, Soumendra Nath
dc.contributor.author	Datta, Samar K.
dc.date.accessioned	2010-04-17T06:46:52Z
dc.date.available	2010-04-17T06:46:52Z
dc.date.copyright	1991-05
dc.date.issued	2010-04-17T06:46:52Z
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/2246
dc.description.abstract	Costly monitoring is an important market imperfection in developed as well as developing economies. In developed countries monitoring costs are usually minimized through intermediation. The intermediation process is hampered, however, by market fragmentation typical of developing agrarian economies. Borrowers may choose to use private moneylenders rather than formal banking sector intermediaries. A theory of loan contract choice is developed which emphasizes the role of monitoring costs and transaction interlinkages. The theory is tested against survey data from rural West Bengal. The results are consistent with the main conclusions of the model.	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;1991/936
dc.subject	Optimal	en
dc.subject	Loan Contracts	en
dc.subject	Rural India	en
dc.title	Monitoring cost transaction interlinkage and the selection of optimal loan contracts: evidence from rural India	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en