Winner’s curse in mergers & acquisitions with common auditors

dc.contributor.advisor	Pingali, Vishwanath
dc.contributor.advisor	Rampal, Jeevant
dc.contributor.author	Malhotra, Vasu
dc.contributor.author	Singh, Kapil Kumar
dc.date.accessioned	2020-02-11T08:54:08Z
dc.date.available	2020-02-11T08:54:08Z
dc.date.issued	2018
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/22886
dc.description.abstract	The academic origins of Winner’s curse lie in a paper by Capen, Clapp and Campbell (Capen, E.C., Clapp, R.V., and Campbell, W.M., “Competitive Bidding in High Risk Situations”, Journal of Petroleum Technology, June 1971, Pg. 641-653) who state the following: “In competitive bidding, the winner tends to be the player who most overestimates true tract value…Unexpectedly low rates of return… follow the industry into competitive lease sale environments year after year. This must mean that by and large industry is paying more for the property than it ultimately is worth. But each competitor thinks he is playing a reasonable strategy.”	en_US
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.publisher	Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad	en_US
dc.subject	Industry	en_US
dc.subject	Mergers - Acquisitions	en_US
dc.subject	Information asymmetry	en_US
dc.title	Winner’s curse in mergers & acquisitions with common auditors	en_US
dc.type	Student Project	en_US