dc.contributor.author | Jain, Shalini | |
dc.contributor.author | Desai, Naman | |
dc.contributor.author | Pingali, Viswanath | |
dc.contributor.author | Tripathy, Arindam | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-03-15T10:39:10Z | |
dc.date.available | 2023-03-15T10:39:10Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2023-03-10 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Jain, S. P., Desai, N., Pingali, V., & Tripathy, A. (2023). Choosing Beyond Compliance Over Dormancy: Corporate Response to India’s Mandatory CSR Expenditure Law. Management and Organization Review, 1–30. https://doi.org/10.1017/mor.2022.57 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 1740-8784 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/26122 | |
dc.description.abstract | This article examines whether firms engaged in high levels of voluntary CSR (corporate social responsibility) alter their strategic choices in response to detrimental public policy – specifically India's Companies Act (2013) that mandates qualifying firms to spend 2% of their three-year average net profits on CSR. Drawing on the concept of organizational dormancy, we argue that firm capabilities, political awareness, exposure to political pluralism, and ownership identity may explain choice heterogeneity among these firms. Our key and non-intuitive finding is that even in the absence of discretionary choice in determining optimal CSR expenditure, firms are less likely to choose dormancy and instead embrace and even surpass the stipulations of the law in their CSR contributions. Also, politically aware firms are more likely to opt for dormancy over compliance. Managerial and policy implications are discussed. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Cambridge University Press | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Management and organization review | en_US |
dc.subject | CSR regulation | en_US |
dc.subject | detrimental public policy | en_US |
dc.subject | India | en_US |
dc.subject | organizational dormancy | en_US |
dc.title | Choosing beyond compliance over dormancy: corporate response to India's mandatory CSR expenditure law | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |