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dc.contributor.authorCarvalho, Margarida
dc.contributor.authorDragotto, Gabriele
dc.contributor.authorFeijoo, Felipe
dc.contributor.authorLodi, Andrea
dc.contributor.authorSankaranarayanan, Sriram
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-03T06:03:34Z
dc.date.available2024-01-03T06:03:34Z
dc.date.issued2023-12-22
dc.identifier.issn15265501
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11718/27002
dc.description.abstractThis article introduces a class of Nash games among Stackelberg players (NASPs), namely, a class of simultaneous noncooperative games where the players solve sequential Stackelberg games. Specifically, each player solves a Stackelberg game where a leader optimizes a (parametrized) linear objective function subject to linear constraints, whereas its followers solve convex quadratic problems subject to the standard optimistic assumption. Although we prove that deciding if a NASP instance admits a Nash equilibrium is generally a Σp2 -hard decision problem, we devise two exact and computationally efficient algorithms to compute and select Nash equilibria or certify that no equilibrium exists. We use NASPs to model the hierarchical interactions of international energy markets where climate change aware regulators oversee the operations of profit-driven energy producers. By combining real-world data with our models, we find that Nash equilibria provide informative, and often counterintuitive, managerial insights for market regulators.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherINFORMSen_US
dc.relation.ispartofManagement Scienceen_US
dc.subjectAlgorithmic game theoryen_US
dc.subjectInteger programmingen_US
dc.subjectBilevel optimizationen_US
dc.subjectStackelberg gameen_US
dc.titleWhen Nash meets Stackelbergen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US


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