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Procedures for generating an informationally efficient equitable solution
(Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, 1989-02-01)
In this paper we consider two games which generate A- envy free allocations in a pure exchange economy with a fixed supply of resources and agents preferences being representable by utility functions. The first game is ...
Rationalization of bargaining solutions by symmetric metrics and respect for unanimity
(Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, 1989-09-01)
In this paper we show that rationalizability of bargaining solution by a symmetric metric implies that the bargaining solution is anonymous. We further show that rations ability of a bargaining solution by a metric implies ...
Egalitarian departures from the ideal point
(Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, 1989-11-01)
In this paper we propose a new solution to bargaining or group decision problems, which requires an arbitrator to choose that point on the pareto frontier of the feasible set where losses in utility from the ideal point ...
Independence of irrelevant transfers
(Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, 1989-10-01)
In this paper, we provide a partial geometric characterization of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIM) Axiom, called Independence of Irrelevant Transfers (IIT) as also a characterization of the nash bargaining ...
Fair allocations and distortion of utilities: A note
(Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, 1989-01-01)
Given two agents with von neumann- morgenstern utilities who wish to divide n commodities, consider the two- person non- cooperative game with strategies consisting of concave, increasing von neumann- Morenstern utility ...
Coalitional fairness and distortion of utilities
(Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, 1989-01-01)
Given a finite number of agents with utilities who wish to divide a finite number of commodities, consider the non- cooperative game with strategies consisting of concave, increasing utility functions and whose outcomes ...
Threat bargaining problems with incomplete information and Nash's solution
(Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, 1989-12-01)
In this paper we extend the framework of threat bargaining games to include those with incomplete information. In this set up we address ourselves to two significant problems: (1) Under what conditions would 'truthful' ...