A Note on axiomatic characterizations of the Nash bargaining solution

dc.contributor.author	Lahiri, Somdeb
dc.date.accessioned	2009-12-12T06:31:23Z
dc.date.available	2009-12-12T06:31:23Z
dc.date.copyright	1994-03
dc.date.issued	2009-12-12T06:31:23Z
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/504
dc.description.abstract	In this paper, to begin with we present a generalization of the independence of irrelevant expansions assumption to the situation with an arbitrary yet finite number of players, and with the help of a comparatively simpler proof than the one suggested by Thomas (19981), we uniquely characterize the Nash bargaining solution.	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;1172
dc.subject	Axiomatic characterization	en
dc.title	A Note on axiomatic characterizations of the Nash bargaining solution	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en