Constrained equal awards solution for claims problems

dc.contributor.author	Lahiri, Somdeb
dc.date.accessioned	2010-07-27T06:11:21Z
dc.date.available	2010-07-27T06:11:21Z
dc.date.copyright	1996-06
dc.date.issued	2010-07-27T06:11:21Z
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/6330
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we propose a variable population framework for the study of claims problems and obtain characterizations of the constrained equal award rule using the following properties: envy-freeness, individual rationality from equal division, resource monotonicity and bilateral consistency.	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;1996/1315
dc.subject	Game theory	en
dc.title	Constrained equal awards solution for claims problems	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en