Risk sensitivity in bargaining and a monotone to nash's bargaining problem

dc.contributor.author	Lahiri, Somdeb
dc.date.accessioned	2010-07-27T06:15:08Z
dc.date.available	2010-07-27T06:15:08Z
dc.date.copyright	1988-10
dc.date.issued	2010-07-27T06:15:08Z
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/6336
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we show that for a new solution to Nash's bargaining problem, proposed by Lahiri (1988) ("Monotonicity with Respect to the Disagreement Point and a New Solution to Nash's Bargaining Problem", IIM, Ahmedabad, Working Paper No. 724), which satisfies monotonicity with respect to the disagreement point, an increase in risk aversion is to the player's own disadvantage and to the advantage of the opponent in the two person case; to the advantage of all opponents in the multi-person generalization. Thus it parallels results on risk-sensitivity for the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions.	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;1988/769
dc.subject	Bargaining	en
dc.subject	nash bargaining solution	en
dc.subject	Risk	en
dc.title	Risk sensitivity in bargaining and a monotone to nash's bargaining problem	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en