Threat bargaining problems with correlated beliefs
dc.contributor.author | Lahiri, Somdeb | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-07-27T09:41:48Z | |
dc.date.available | 2010-07-27T09:41:48Z | |
dc.date.copyright | 1991-06 | |
dc.date.issued | 2010-07-27T09:41:48Z | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11718/6408 | |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper we provide a general framework for studying threat bargaining games with correlated beliefs. In this framework we obtain a characterization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution without any monotonicity assumption. The approach adds a dose of realism to the already existing literature on threat bargaining games. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | WP;1991/944 | |
dc.subject | Bargaining Power | en |
dc.subject | Bargaining | en |
dc.title | Threat bargaining problems with correlated beliefs | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
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