Threat bargaining problems with correlated beliefs

dc.contributor.author	Lahiri, Somdeb
dc.date.accessioned	2010-07-27T09:41:48Z
dc.date.available	2010-07-27T09:41:48Z
dc.date.copyright	1991-06
dc.date.issued	2010-07-27T09:41:48Z
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/6408
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we provide a general framework for studying threat bargaining games with correlated beliefs. In this framework we obtain a characterization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution without any monotonicity assumption. The approach adds a dose of realism to the already existing literature on threat bargaining games.	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;1991/944
dc.subject	Bargaining Power	en
dc.subject	Bargaining	en
dc.title	Threat bargaining problems with correlated beliefs	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en