Top cycle and uncovered solutions for abstract games: axiomatic characterizations

dc.contributor.author	Lahiri, Somdeb
dc.date.accessioned	2010-01-18T08:33:17Z
dc.date.available	2010-01-18T08:33:17Z
dc.date.copyright	2000-11
dc.date.issued	2010-01-18T08:33:17Z
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11718/812
dc.description.abstract	In this paper we consider binary relations which are reflexive and complete. Such binary relations are referred to in the literature as abstract games. Given an abstract game a (game)solution is a function which associates to each subset a non-empty collection of points of the subset. In this paper we provide axiomatic characterizations of the top cycle and uncovered solutions for abstract games. In a final section of the paper, the similarity between a game solution and a choice function of classical rational choice theory is exploited to axiomatically characterize the top cycle and uncovered choice functions.	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	WP;2000-11-02/1626
dc.subject	Axiomatic - Characterization	en
dc.title	Top cycle and uncovered solutions for abstract games: axiomatic characterizations	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en